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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

1 June 1978

National Intelligence Officers

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/CH
FROM [redacted]
National Officer for China
SUBJECT : Senate Draft Study on Intelligence
Concerning China
25X1A
REFERENCE : [redacted] 112535-78, 24 May 1978, Same
Subject

Page 53 of referenced study was inadvertently omitted
from the copy sent to you. It is forwarded as an attach-
ment to this memorandum.

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Attachment: Page 53

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FROM ATTACHMENT

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[redacted] 12535-78/1
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provincial developments in China, detailed bits of information provided by NSA, FBIS materials, open source materials, and travelers' reports.

° Nonmilitary intelligence targets in China must be given markedly fuller coverage (and analytical exploitation) [redacted]

° Present largely informal, ad hoc means should be procedurally strengthened so that intelligence analysts can regularly debrief senior policymaking or intelligence operations officers, or otherwise gain (non-policy) information or "feel" they may have concerning many Chinese questions and personalities -- but which often does not find its way into data banks and analytical consciousness.

° The improvements of the past year or so in the management of the intelligence community and its relationships with policymaking consumers are a good start toward a much needed improved overview of the total U. S. intelligence effort on China. As it is, [redacted] China specialists still tend to be sequestered away in their particular nooks of the intelligence community, continuing to do their same particular chores. There is

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